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PERSONS AND CONSEQUENCES: 
OBSERVATIONS ON FRIED'S RIGHT AND 
WRONG 
Stephen R. Munzer*t 
RIGHT AND WRONG. By Charles Fried. Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: Harvard University Press. 1978. Pp. xi, 226. $15. 
I. .ABSOLUTIST DEONTOLOGY 
Philosophers commonly divide theories of normative ethics 
into two main types. Teleological theories hold that actions are 
right if they advance a certain nonmoral end and wrong if they 
retard it. Utilitarianism is a teleological theory that maintains we 
should advance the greatest happiness of the greatest number.1 
A standard objection to utilitarianism is that it sometimes com-
mits us to doing an act because it produces better consequences 
than any available alternative act, even though we know or feel 
it to be wrong. Deontological theories, such as the ethics ofKant,2 
hold that an act is right if it is in obedience to, and wrong if it 
violates, a moral principle.3 A frequent criticism is that this sort 
of moral theory sometimes commits us to doing an act because a 
moral principle requires it, even though to do it would have grave 
consequences. 
In Right and Wrong, Professor Charles Fried, more per-
suaded by the objection to utilitarianism than by the criticism of 
deontological systems, defends a deontological theory of moral-
ity. 4 Fried aims to develop an account of what good persons 
should and should not do, rather than, say, to analyze moral 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1966, University of Kan-
sas; B. Phil. 1969, Oxford; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School.-Ed. 
t I wish to thank Lance D. Becker, Allen Buchanan, James W. Nickel, and M.B.E. 
Smith for their detailed and very helpful comments on drafts of this review. 
1. Classical statements include .J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PmNcIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970); J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 
(S. Gorovitz ed. 1971). A modern formulation is Smart, An Outline of a System of Utili-
tarian Ethics, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FoR AND AGAINST 3 (1973). 
2. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORAUI (H.J. Paton trans. 1948); I. 
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (6th ed. T.K. Abbott trans. 1909). 
3. The distinction between teleological and deontological theories is not unproble-
matic; in particular, the principle of utility must be kept from counting as the sort of 
"moral principle" that figures in deontological theories. Problems of this sort cannot be 
pursued here. 
4. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number only]. 
421 
422 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:421 
l.anguage.5 He concentrates on personal moral choice; though he 
treats briefly such issues as fair contributions to the community,11 
he is not in the main concerned to outline basic institutions for a 
just society. 7 His chief critical target is utilitarianism, 8 and his 
alternative is a deontological system which consists, to use his 
terminology, of "categorical norms."9 Fried does not list all the 
norms of his system.10 In fact he discusses in detail only two 
norms in the first part of the book, where he devotes a chapter 
each to the norms that one must not intentionally inflict physical 
harm on an innocent person11 and that one must not lie. 12 The 
middle part of the book concerns rights. Fried first examines the 
economic analysis of rights, 13 and then outlines his own system of 
rights to complement the system of categorical norms. His system 
includes "positive" rights, which are claims to something, such 
as to a fair share of social resources, and "negative" rights, which 
are rights not to be interfered with in some way, as by being lied 
to, assaulted, or falsely arrested.14 The final part of his essay has 
to do with roles.15 Much "discretionary space,"16 in Fried's view, 
is left by the categories of right and wrong. Within that space, 
people may act as they please. Moreover, they can increase their 
freedom of action to some extent by assuming certain roles. For 
the occupant of a role may sometimes bestow more resources on 
others.:......such as patients, clients, or friends-than fairness or util-
ity would allow. The integrity of such roles as doctor, lawyer, and 
5. For such an analysis, see, e.g., R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963); R.M. 
HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952). 
6. See pp. 139-50. 
7. Such a concern predominates in, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), 
8. Fried often uses the somewhat broader term "consequentialism." E.g., pp, 2, 7-
10. In this usage he appears to follow Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. SMART 
& B. WILIJAMs, UTILITARIANISM: FoR AND AGAINST 77, 79-93 (1973). Nothing in this Review 
turns on any difference between the two terms. 
Many prominent contemporary philosophers share Fried's opposition to utilitarian-
ism. See, e.g., Williams, supra. Other essays that figure in Fried's perspective include 
Anscombe, Who is Wronged?, 5 OXFORD REv. 16 (1967); Anscombe, Modern Moral 
Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958); Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & Pua, AFF. 123 
(1972); Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 293 (1977). Favorable 
references to these works are scattered throughout Fried's notes on pp. 197-219. 
9. See pp. 11-12 & passim. 
10. A contrast is provided by B. GERT, THE MORAL RULES (1966), which lists exactly 
ten basic rules. 
11. See pp. 30-53. 
12. See pp. 54-78. 
13. See pp. 81-107. 
14. See pp. 108-63. 
15. See pp. 167-94. 
16. P. 168. 
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friend is not, Fried contends, to be invaded in the name of the 
common good. 17 
If Fried's moral views formed only another deontology they 
might arouse modest interest, but their absolutism is likely to 
raise eyebrows. He holds that violating categorical moral norms 
is wrong even if significantly better consequences would flow from 
violation than from obedience: 
Our first moral duty is to do right and to avoid wrong. We must 
do no wrong-even if by doing wrong, suffering would be reduced 
and the sum of happiness increased. Indeed, we must not do wrong 
even in order to prevent more, greater wrongs by others. 18 
Similarly, rights are defined as "categorical moral entities such 
that the violation of a right is always wrong."19 
These, then, are some of the main doctrines of Fried's abso-
lutist deontology. Behind them stands a view of human beings as 
rational moral agents who are responsible for _their choices. 20 This 
is not merely the innocuous thesis that persons should be ac-
countable for choices. It is the more debatable claim that, so far 
as the absolute force of categorical norms is concerned, persons 
are morally responsible for the intended effects of their choices, 
but not for unintended ( even if foreknown) causal consequences 
of their actions.21 So far as rights are concerned, specific negative 
rights limit sharply the encroachments that the community may 
make on its members, who are at liberty to act as they choose 
aside from permissible encroachments. That freedom of action 
can in some respects be increased when persons occupy a role, 
which can shield them from otherwise valid moral claims. This 
starkly individualist account of respect for persons contrasts 
with, and indeed is directed against, a pervasive duty to act for 
the general welfare which Fried believes that the utilitarian will 
invo~e. 
Much that is fundamental in moral philosophy is at stake in 
Fried's book. It is hard to be confident that any sophisticated 
moral theory is wrong, and it is even harder to be sure that one 
has a better theory to replace it. This Review airs doubts on 
some of Fried's leading doctrines. It is not a brief for utilitarian-
17. See :p. 194. 
18. P. 2. See also pp. 3, 8-9. 
19. P. His. See also p. 132. Fried may intend that this doctrine apply only to negative 
rights, for on p. 113 he says that positive rights cannot be counted "categorical entities." 
See also p. 110. 
20. See pp. 20-29. 
21. See pp. 20-22. 
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i_sm. So far as my comments rest on a substantive position of their 
own, they invoke, very tentatively, a pluralist or mixed theory in 
which otherwise deontological principles can to some extent be 
qualified or overridden by consequences. Such a position has 
implications for moral norms, negative rights, respect for persons, 
and the role of lawyer. 
Fried's discussion of the economic analysis of rights22 lies 
outside the concerns of this Review. I am not in any event qual-
ified to appraise it in detail, but would like to note briefly an 
ambiguity in his discussion. Fried argues that the economic anal-
ysis contemplates a bargaining process; hence it can provide no 
theory of "rights" to informed choices and voluntary exchanges, 
because if such rights were also open to negotiation, one could not 
properly describe the exchanges between individuals as 
"bargaining" at all.23 The ambiguity is whether Fried intends this 
argument to establish only the modest claim that informed 
choices and voluntary exchanges are background conditions for 
bargaining, 24 or the ambitious claim that there are rights to such 
choices and exchanges. 25 The modest claim follows from plausible 
assumptions about what can count as bargaining. One could then 
try independently to show that there is a moral right to informed 
choices and voluntary exchanges by providing an alternative, or 
supplementary, theory of rights.28 But Fried's argument does not 
establish the ambitious claim.27 One could agree that bargaining 
presupposes that informed choices and voluntary exchanges in 
fact exist, but deny that there are rights to them. So the discus-
22. See pp. 81-107. 
23. See pp. 100-04. 
24. See p. 103: "[S]ome freedom from unconsented-to imposition must be assumed 
as a privileged starting point, a background against which the very concept of bargaining 
is defined." 
25. See pp.100 ("background entitlements"), 104 ("assumption of some rights before 
the process gets started"). 
26. Fried appears to acknowledge the need for such a theory on p. 105, and tries to 
offer it in the next two chapters. See also p. 89. 
27. In two passages Fried may move unawares from the modest to the ambitious 
claim. 
In [the economic analysis of rights], knowledge and rationality are treated both 
as conditions for making the theory work and as specific goods subject to the 
processes which the theory founds. What we have, in short, are pretheoretic goods, 
or rights, assumed to be necessary if the theory is to work at all. [P. 102 (emphasis 
in original)] 
And if a useful theory must assume prebargaining privileged starting points, then 
[Coase's theorem] and [the economic analysis of rights] do not provide a com-
plete account of rights and liabilities as the outcome of their processes, since they 
require the assumption of some rights before the process gets started. [P. 104] 
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sion of the economic analysis does not itself establish that there 
are any such rights. Nor, of course, does it show that, if there are 
such rights, a person may not voluntarily limit or renounce them 
for the future. 
II. CATEGORICAL NORMS OF RIGHT AND WRONG 
Fried's deontological system consists of categorical moral 
norms, 28 such as the norms forbidding lying and intentional phys-
ical harm. The word "categorical," as Fried uses it, covers two 
different characteristics. One is independence of end. This is the 
Kantian sense in which a categorical imperative directs an agent 
to act without regard to his desires, interests, or ends-"Do not 
lie." It is opposed to a "hypothetical" imperative, which involves 
reference to some desire, interest, or end of the agent-"If you 
want to be admired, do not lie."29 The other characteristic is 
absoluteness. A categorical norm "displaces" competing judg-
ments, so that they cannot be urged as reasons for violating the 
norm.3° Fried calls categorical even those norms which invite the 
weighing of consequences, like that against exposing another's 
property to undue risk; for once the weighing process is complete, 
it is wrong not to follow the outcome. 31 An important qualification 
to Fried's system is his. clajm that categorical norms do not apply 
to trivial or absurd situations. The norm against physical harm 
does not speak to the morality of pinching or of murdering a single 
innocent person to save the rest of humanity from torture and 
death.32 
This account of moral norms appears open to technical and 
substantive objections. On the technical side, Fried's discussion 
of the supposed "categorical" character of norms is deficient. To 
28. See pp. 11-13 & passim. 
29. See pp. 11-12. 
30. P. 12. 
31. Seep. 12. To some this may well seem a weakened sense of "categorical," since 
as much might be said of the outcome of a utilitarian calculation of consequences (though 
a sophisticated utilitarian might qualify this in the way suggested by Lyons's reading of 
Mill, see note 79 infra and accompanying text). 
A curious feature of Fried's system is that some norms, such as that against physical 
harm, are categorical as to intentional harm, but in the case of unintended indirect harm 
that norm, it is said, "switches out of its absolute mode and balancing is the order of the 
day" (p. 52). Fried does not explain why the norm should behave in this way. At all events, 
if the position on p. 12 regarding the outcome of the weighing process is followed, then 
once balancing has dictated a result in a case involving unintended indirect harm, it would 
appear to be wrong not to abide by that result. 
32. See pp. 12, 30-31. 
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begin, the two features embraced by the term "categorical," as 
Fried uses it, need not go together. A norm might be absolute, yet 
still be "hypothetical," should its validity depend on some end 
(happiness, perhaps) that all adopt.33 And the norm might apply 
independently of one's end, but not be absolute, if other consider-
ations can override its application. Fried offers no defense of his 
apparent assumption that these two supposed features of moral 
norms are indissolubly connected. More seriously, that norms are 
deontological rather than consequentialist does not entail that 
they are categorical in Fried's sense. A norm might avoid appeal-
ing to consequences, and yet be neither absolute nor independent 
of end. 
A deeper technical problem is that deontological norms can 
convincingly be called absolute only if two further theories are 
made out. Fried's book does not offer the first and fails to make 
out the second. The first is a theory of moral knowledge and 
justification. That is, an account must be given, or at least in-
voked, of how we know what moral norms there are and of why 
those norms are absolute and stand independent of human de-
sires. Fried does not seem to ground the categorical norms pre-
sented in Right and Wrong in any such account. Perhaps he 
wishes to rest these norms on some supposed moral intuition that 
tells us they exist, or on a Kantian theory that they can be justi-
fied in terms of some fundamental principle presupposed by 
moral thinking and rooted in our rational nature. Yet Fried 
makes no effort to state either line of argument or to defend either 
against objection. Several passages suggest that Fried holds the 
different view that categorical norms express the value of respect 
for persons.34 Such a view would certainly accord with the central-
ity of persons in Fried's moral vision. But tantalizing suggestions 
are not arguments, nor do they establish why moral norms must 
express Fried's view of respect for persons rather than some other 
view, such as the utilitarian principle of counting each person for 
one and no person for more than one. Moreover, one passage 
seems to intimate that it is up to us to choose to respect persons. 30 
If we choose not to, does that mean we are not bound by moral 
norms? To answer that we are not bound seems to make the 
validity of moral norms subjective-a conclusion that Fried 
33. See Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81 PHIL. REV. 305 
(1972). 
34. See pp. 8-9, 28-29. 
35. See pp. 8-9. But see p. 29. See also p. 63. 
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might find uncongenial. To answer that we are bound would 
imply, contra hypothesis, that the validity of the norms does not 
rest on our choosing to respect persons. Again, can any reason be 
given within Fried's theory why we should choose to respect 
persons? To say that it would be wrong not to do so appears 
circular, since the norms of right and wrong are supposed to be 
grounded on that choice. In any case, until Fried provides or 
invokes a theory of moral knowledge and justification, his moral 
norms, together with assurances of their categorical character, 
must stand in mid-air. 
The second theory needed is a convincing account of the 
individuation of moral norms, that is, of why and how the total 
content of a moral system is to be divided into smaller units. 
Fried supposes that this content is to be represented as absolute 
norms which are so structured that, with the exceptions stated, 
no norm conflicts with another and each norm dictates a result 
within its range of application. This supposition is open to doubt. 
Morality may be composed of different types of basic units-for 
instance, specific "rules" that apply pretty rigidly to actions they 
cover, together with broad "principles" that exert less definitive 
force where they apply.36 In addition, even ifwe assume that there 
is only one type of basic unit and agree to use the word "norm," 
it may be that moral norms overlap in their ranges-of application. 
In that event, one norm might forbid what another requires or 
permits. Conflicts of this sort might, perhaps, be irresolvable 
within the system; certainly some reputable contemporary phi-
losophers have defended this possibility.37 But even if such con-
flicts are thought resolvable, we still need to know what excep-
tions and limitations38 each norm has, how norms are related to 
one another,39 and how conflicts are to be resolved. Moral norms 
themselves may be deontological enough, but exceptions and lim-
itations and the resolution of conflicts will, perhaps, depend 
partly on consequences. Or it may be that consequences are quite 
36. See Singer, Moral Rules and Principles, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 160 (A.I. 
Melden ed. 1958). 
37. See B. WILLIAMS, Ethical Consistency and Consistency and Realism, in PROBLEMS 
OF THE SELF 166, 187 (1973); Lemmon, Moral Dilemmas, 71 PHIL. REv. 139 (1962). Fried's 
view seems to be to the contrary. Seep. 112. 
38. On the difference between exceptions and limitations, see J. BENTHAM, Or LAWS 
IN GENERAL 113-16 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); Hart, Bentham on Legal Powers, 81 YALE L.J. 
799, 803-04 (1972). 
39. Discussion bearing on this issue may be found in J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND 
NORMS (1975). See also ,J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970); Nozick, Moral 
Complications and Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L.F. 1 (1968). 
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beside the point. At any rate, moral norms may turn out not to 
be absolute, and reasoning about moral problems may exhibit a 
different character from the casuistry that Fried is concerned to 
establish.~0 
Some are likely also to find faults of substance with Fried's 
categorical moral norms. For instance, his view that moral norms 
do not apply to absurd or trivial cases seems confused. The anni-
hilation of humanity may be catastrophic and pinching may be 
trivial, but why are those reasons for saying that the norm against 
intentional infliction of physical harm simply does not apply? A 
more natural account would perhaps pay some attention to conse-
quences. Absurdity does not mean that a moral norm is inapplic-
able and simply disappears from the consideration of the case. 
Rather, it means that other considerations may override or defeat 
the application of the norm. If, as in Bernard Williams's famous 
example, 41 one faces the choice of killing one person or of allowing 
another to kill twenty, the norm against murder does not vanish 
from one's deliberations. Instead, the horrible consequence of 
twenty deaths may override its application to the case at hand, 
and thus license the intentional taking of a life, an action which 
in other circumstances would be wrong. The matter of pinching 
and triviality is in some ways more complicated. If, as Fried 
sometimes appears to think, pinching is indeed physical harm, •2 
40. Fried's view of moral norms and moral reasoning is suggested by this passage: 
In every case the norm has boundaries and what lies outside those boundaries is 
not forbidden at all. Thus lying is wrong, while withholding a truth which another 
needs may be perfectly permissible-but that is because withholding truth is not 
lying. Murder is wrong but killing in self-defense is not. The absoluteness of the 
norm is preserved in these cases, but only by virtue of a process which defines its 
boundaries. That process is different from the process by which good and bad are 
weighed in consequentialism, and so the distinctiveness of judgments of right and 
wrong is preserved. [P. 10) 
In a footnote to the last sentence Fried adds: 
Consider this case: Is it wrong to take another's property? Well, what of emer-
gencies, as when I need your car to get to the hospital and you won't consent? 
Perhaps what is wrong in that case is not taking the car but taking it without 
compensating you for its use. What if I do not have the money? Perhaps what is 
wrong is not compensating you when I can. Though qualified in various ways, the 
judgment still seems to be absolute. [P. 10 n.•] 
41. See Williams, supra note 8, at 98-99. 
42. "By physical harm I mean an impingement upon the body which either causes 
pain or impairs functioning ...• This definition covers a wide range of consequences. It 
covers everything from killing to pinching ... " (p. 30). On p. 42, Fried appears to regard 
pushing through a crowd as involving harm; if so minimal an impact on others constitutes 
physical harm, then perhaps he believes that pinching does so a fortiori. 
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then the norm against intentional physical harm does apply after 
all. Of course, the consequences of pinching are typically so slight 
that we do not ordinarily perceive much need for moral delibera-
tion. But it would appear that since the norm applies, a wrong 
has been committed-though only a small wrong, for the pain is 
slight. Surely this is no less plausible than Fried's assertion that 
a "little lie is a little wrong, but it is still something you must not 
do."43 Suppose, however, that Fried believes that pinching does 
not really amount to physical harm after all. 44 In that case the 
norm does not apply. But the reason is misdescribed as triviality, 
for, as noted, Fried is prepared to say that a little lie is s~ill wrong. 
Rather, the norm does not apply because the term ''physical 
harm" captures only actions which have consequences that reach 
some threshold of seriousness. In this case, consequences do not 
(as in absurd situations) override or defeat the application of the 
norm, but are built into key terms used to state the norm.45 
Fried also holds that defense of one's property against attack 
is permitted, not by some balancing process, "but because the 
'aggressor-victim' himself intends a violation of the agent's 
rights."46 Fried seems in the end to support this position with a 
consent argument: The would-be robber in effect chooses physical 
injury in pursuit of someone's property.47 And Fried flirts with a 
proportionality requirement under which the owner may not kill 
or maim to protect property of slight value.48 I believe that de-
fense of one's property is also illuminated by some reference to 
consequences. The person robbed is not, assuredly, called upon 
to weigh his interests against the robber's, and then yield to the 
slightest balance in the latter's favor. The idea is rather that if 
the net adverse consequences of defending property are substan-
tial, as by maiming the robber to protect an inexpensive watch, 
then there may be an obligation not to maim. The consent argu-
ment is dubious. As Fried notes, an odd sort of consent is attrib-
43. P. 69. 
44. This interpretation is suggested by Fried's statement that the "formal nature" 
of the prohibition of physical harm is the same for cases of "maiming," "blinding," and 
"temporary infliction of severe pain" (p. 30). Such harms are said to be "further along 
the line of seriousness" from pinching, id.; these "harms we must not intend to inflict, 
and consideration of consequences as such cannot outweigh that judgment" (p. 31). 
45. This suggests that formulation of the distinction between teleological and deonto-
logical theories must attend to the different ways consequences can bear on the applicabil-
ity of a norm. · 
46. P. 46. 
47. See pp. 46-47. 
48. See p. 47. 
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uted to the thief, 49 who would prefer to get the property without 
injury. In any event, often the thief will not squarely face such a 
choice, 50 and hence imputing his consent to injury is there im-
plausible. The proportionality requirement is a sensible limita-
tion, but it is hard to see how it can be imposed in Fried's system. 
If consequences have any internal relevance to his norm against 
physical harm, it is only to establish some threshold below which 
there is no "physical harm" at all. 51 That is of no help here; 
maiming is at once plainly above that threshold and plainly 
below the catastrophic effects that Fried regards as absurd. 
Hence Fried seems debarred from a proportionality requirement, 
because that requirement would allow us to say that protecting 
an inexpensive article can be outweighed by the consequences of 
maiming. 
Do all these criticisms amount to anything more than the 
vague idea that consequences count, though not as directly or as 
much as in utilitarianism? Perhaps they do, in two ways. In the 
first place, this substantive critique joins hands with the techni-
cal objections made earlier. The norms of morality are not drawn 
up completely without regard to consequences, with ad hoc lower 
and upper bounds of triviality and absurdity. Rather, moral 
norms, or perhaps different types of moral units (such as rules 
and principles), may come into competition with one another. 
Consequences may be germane, though often not decisive, in re-
solving competing claims and in setting exceptions to and limita-
tions on these norms. Secondly, the substantive criticisms em-
body one variety of pluralist or mixed-value theory of morality. 
The guiding idea is that it distorts or leads to confusion to sup-
pose that, on all occasions of moral choice, the answer to the 
question "Would this action be wrong?" should be answered by 
fixing carefully on a deontological principle and articulating a 
casuistry without regard to consequences.52 Rather, one must 
often split the problem into component issues requiring indepen-
dent consideration. One begins with the issue of which deontolog-
ical norms bear on the moral choice. One then asks, partly in 
relation to consequences, how far those principles extend and 
when noncompliance with one of them is justified or excused, or 
is required by some competing principle. All this raises difficult 
49. See id. 
50. Fried's discussion presupposes a situation in which the thief does squarely face 
such a choice. See pp. 46-47. 
51. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text. 
52. Seep. 10 & n.*, quoted at note 40 supra. 
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questions. Is a pluralist model unsatisfyingly ad hoc? How does 
one constrain the force of consequences once their relevance has 
been admitted? How does one rank deontological principles once 
it is said that consequences are not decisive? If I had answers to 
these questions, I should be glad to share them. Still, it may at 
least be worth investigating whether a pluralist model can eman-
cipate us from both the single-mindedness of utilitarianism and 
the absolutism of Fried's deontology. 
III. NEGATIVE RIGHTS 
Kindred difficulties seem to arise in Fried's discussion of 
negative rights. For Fried it is invariably wrong to violate a 
right, 53 and one must do no wrong even though great good would 
come of it or great harm be averted.54 Negative rights, it will be 
recalled, are rights not to be interfered with in some way.55 Exam-
ples include the rights not to be lied to, assaulted, or falsely 
arrested, not to have one's property stolen or one's good name 
sullied, not to have one's freedom of speech and movement 
impeded, and not to be forced to incriminate oneself.55 Negative 
rights, like categorical norms, "displace"57 other normative con-
siderations: They cannot be overridden or defeated by conse-
quences,58 nor do they conflict with one another.59 
I wish to suggest, however, that it is logically possible for 
negative rights to come into competition with other normative 
considerations. For instance, the right not to be lied to might 
conflict with some substantial good consequences that would flow 
from telling a lie. Suppose that a government investigator pro-
poses to question Barnes. The investigator has a right to the 
truth; the political system and the investigation are in the cause 
of justice, and Barnes has, not anticipating any quandaries, 
promised to tell all that she knows. As the questioning proceeds, 
it becomes clear that the target of the investigation is Fletcher, 
53. See pp. 108, 113, 132. 
54. See pp. 2, 3, 8. 
55. See p. 110. 
56. See pp. 110-12, 133-34. These are "personal" negative rights, except for that 
against self-incrimination, which is a "legal" negative right (pp. 133-34). Legal negative 
rights also have categorical status (p. 139). Fried recognizes as well a class of "political" 
rights, such as the rights to vote and to participate in government, on pp. 133-34; insofar 
as these rights are said to have "large negative elements" (p. 134 n.*), they would seem 
to be categorical. 
57. Seep. 12. 
58. Seep. 81. 
59. See pp. 112-13; note 63 infra. 
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whom Barnes knows to be innocent of wrongdoing. One skillfully 
phrased question poses a dilemma. The true answer appears to 
incriminate Fletcher, and will surely lead to his imprisonment for 
ten years, as there is no way that the appearance can be rebutted; 
a lie, whose falsity would never be discovered, would throw the 
investigator off and ensure that Fletcher will remain free. Fried 
must conclude that Barnes is to answer truthfully, because one 
must do no wrong even though another's suffering would be 
avoided.60 Yet the more appealing response would seem to be that 
a lie is justified. Observe that lying in this instance cannot be 
brought under Fried's heading of absurdity; the consequences of 
telling the truth are not, like the torment and death of all human-
ity, 61 catastrophic. Observe, too, that a decision to lie is not 
reached easily and obviously. The investigator's right not to be 
lied to should have a nonconsequentialist force which cannot be 
overcome simply by a slight advantage in favor of lying. But here 
the consequences of a true answer are, though not catastrophic, 
very heavily outweighed by the beneficial consequences of a lie 
that will never be discovered. The decision to lie, while perhaps 
an occasion of disquiet and regret, seems justifiable. The right not 
to be lied to should, in these circumstances, be overridden by the 
overwhelming balance of consequences. 
Negative rights logically can, perhaps, also come into compe-
tition with each other. As a possible example, consider a case 
involving the right against self-incrimination82 and the right not 
to have one's name sullied. Hanson, a witness in a civil trial for 
libel, exclusively possesses one item of evidence. The evidence 
relates to a writing of Hanson's which has thrown in doubt the 
good name of Thornton, the plaintiff. Thornton's attorney art-
fully poses a question to Hanson on the stand, the answer to 
which will bring that evidence to light. If Hanson invokes his 
right to remain silent, Thornton's reputation will be destroyed. 
Thornton will also suffer a mental breakdown, her family will 
reject her, and her business associates will be ruined. On the other 
side, if Hanson answers truthfully, he will be exposed to a minor 
criminal charge and, if convicted, will receive a short suspended 
sentence but will suffer no other significant ill effects. Pace Fried, 
there appears to be a conflict between Hanson's right against self-
60. Seep. 2. 
61. See p. 31. 
62. For purposes of discussion it will be assumed, with Fried, that this legal right has 
categorical moral status (p. 139). I do not, however, assume in general that legal rights 
are moral rights. 
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incrimination and Thornton's right not to have her good name· 
sullied.83 
Is this conflict of negative rights merely apparent? A de-
fender of Fried might argue that if there is a conflict at all, it is 
only between a negative right and a positive right. Hanson's writ-
ing, not his invoking the negative right against self-incrimination, 
besmirched Thornton's name. So the incompatibility is just be-
tween Hanson's negative right and Thornton's supposed positive 
right to have her name cleared by Hanson. But this seems im-
plausible, because one must see Hanson's entire course of behav-
ior as violating Thornton's negative right not to have her name 
sullied. That right includes the entitlement not to have her name 
continue to be sullied by allowing the libel to stand. Alterna-
tively, a defender of Fried might suggest that the example shows 
only that it would be wrong for Hanson to invoke the right to 
remain silent. 84 To do so might indeed be wrong, but the example 
suggests that, in addition, it might be justifiable to compel Han-
son to answer. The right against self-incrimination is an impor-
tant right, and we might hesitate to invade it. Nevertheless, even 
if we resolve the conflict in Hanson's favor, that does not mean 
that there never was a conflict. Finally, a defender of Fried might 
instead appeal to the concept of intention. In invoking the right 
to remain silent, either Hanson intended to tarnish Thornton's 
name or he did not. If he did, then it would be morally wrong for 
him to remain silent, and we should draw the limits of the right 
against self-incrimination in such a way that it is not available 
in cases of intentional wrong. If he did not, then the harm to 
Thornton's reputation, though foreknown, is merely an unin-
tended consequence and therefore not wrong, and we should up-
hold Hanson's right to remain silent. This, too, seems an implau-
sible way out. On the one hand, should it be wrong for someone 
to intend harm by remaining silent, that would seem to be not 
an abstract condition on the boundaries of the right against self-
63. See pp. 112-13. Fried seems unclear whether logical or only empirical conflict is 
ruled out. He writes that it is "logically possible to respect any number of negative rights 
without necessarily landing in an impossible and contradictory situation" (p. 113). Later 
in the same paragraph, however, he states that positive rights are not categorical entities, 
and gives as an example the supposed impossibility of providing in time of famine a 
subsistence diet to the Indian subcontinent. He then adds: "But it is this impossibility 
which cannot arise in respect to negative rights" (id.). Yet if the food program is indeed 
an impossibility, it is so not af? a matter of logic but as an empirical or technological 
problem of raising sufficient food. 
64. See p. 182. 
434 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:421 
incrimination, but a consideration which, in some instances, 
might override or defeat the application of the right. On the other 
hand, the appeal to unintended harm can be defended only by the 
doctrine of double effect, which holds that while certain bad ef-
fec_ts must not be directly willed, they may be tolerated as the 
foreseen concomitants of one's chosen means or ends. Fried is 
willing to accept this doctrine.85 Nevertheless, it has been heavily 
criticized, 68 and Fried's discussion does not appear to advance its 
plausibility. At all events, even if the doctrine is acceptable in 
general, it may not, in its standard formulations, apply here be-
cause of the lack of a "proportionately grave reason for permitting 
the evil effect."87 Hanson's aim in invoking the doctrine is to 
avoid a minor criminal charge. Without more, it is hard to con-
clude that that aim is a sufficient reason for allowing the grave 
effects on Thornton, her family, and her business associates. 
The point of this discussion has much in common with my 
critique of the categorical character that Fried assigns to moral 
norms. I would suggest that two modifications may be needed of 
his picture of an assemblage of negative rights whose limits have 
been so set that they conflict neither among themselves nor with 
any other relevant moral considerations, and of which every viola-
tion is a wrong. First, an analytical account might be in order 
which recognizes that negative rights are not absolute and can 
come into competition with one another and with other normative 
considerations. One might define a right as prima facie if it can 
be outweighed or overridden in some circumstances by competing 
considerations. To call a right prima facie is not, however, to say 
that it is a bogus right which disappears or is obliterated when-
ever it yields to other considerations. It is a genuine right whose 
applicability can be overridden or defeated by such considera-
tions as consequences and other negative rights. Allied with this 
view of prima facie rights is the idea that not every failure to 
honor a right is a "violation" which is invariably wrong. Some-
times, declining to honor a right may not be wrong, at least if 
compensation is paid, and may be better described as a justified 
infringement than as a violation. Second, a normative account 
65. See pp. 21-22, 202-03. 
66. See, e.g., Bennett, Whatever the Consequences, 26 ANALYSIS 83 (1966); Foot, The 
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE 267 (1976); Thompson, Rights and Deaths, 2 PHIL. & Pue. AFF. 146 (1973). In 
the notes Fried directs the reader's attention to these and other sources (pp. 202-04), 
67. Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, 10 THE0L, 
STUD. 41, 43 (1949) (quoted with approval by Fried on p. 203). 
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may be needed of the relative weights of rights and the other 
considerations to which they can yield. It may be that no full 
account is possible, and that sometimes weights may have to be 
assigned by intuition. Still, an effort should be made to map out 
the structure of rights and to ascertain, so far as possible, the 
power of given rights to withstand pressure from other rights or 
from other normative considerations. The attempt to frame such 
a theory does not commit one to utilitarianism. One can give 
consequences some weight in a normative account uf rights with-
out making them decisive. ·, 
With these modifications, a theory of rights is perhaps better 
able to treat the cases presented earlier. One could now say that 
the right not to be lied to is an important right whose force is not 
exhausted by the net good consequences which attend it. Never-
theless, perhaps that right can, as in Fletcher's case, be overrid-
den by significant good consequences that would flow from in-
fringing it. One might feel more doubt about Hanson's case. Some 
would say that Hanson's right to remain silent should be upheld, 
while others would say that Thornton's right not to have her good 
name sullied should prevail. But one taking the latter position 
need not rely on the doctrine of double effect, or hold that the 
contours of the right against self-incrimination are so tailored 
that it simply has no bearing on the case at hand. Rather, that 
right seems to be outweighed, in these circumstances, by Thorn-
ton's right to her good name. Thornton's right does not draw the 
limits of Hanson's right, but overrides it. 
IV. PERSONS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHOICES 
In Fried's theory, persons are to be respected as rational 
moral agents who are responsible for actions they choose to take, 
but not for unintended causal concomitants of those actions. 68 
The good person's duty is to observe the norms of right and 
wrong. Outside these norms lies an expanse of "discretionary 
space"69 which the good person can fill with other choices. These 
choices are not a matter of right and wrong,70 and a failure typi-
cally to make choices in this area for the benefit of others is not 
morally prohibited. 71 Fried does, indeed, wish to leave room for 
68. See pp. 20-29. 
69. Pp. 167, 168. See also pp. 171-72, 194. 
70. See pp. 13, 175. 
71. See p. 194. 
436 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:421 
acts that are beyond the call of duty;72 yet while supererogatory 
acts make a person noble or saintly or heroic, they are not, of 
course, required for someone merely to be a good person. Fried 
also allows that sometimes one might be obliged to maximize net 
good consequences.73 But in general a person has no duty of be-
nevolence, and the failure to make choices for the benefit of oth-
ers does not make an otherwise good person bad or even diminish 
that person's goodness. 
This view of persons is related to a critical argument that 
Fried directs against utilitarianism.74 He supposes that the utili-
tarian will say that persons are responsible for all the causal 
consequences of their acts, and so in moral deliberation must 
strive to weigh and balance all those consequences, even those 
most remote in space or time. To Fried this involves "dis-
integrating universality, "75 by which he seems to mean an ab-
stract impartiality which breaks apart a person's sense of his own 
uniqueness. 76 For if only the sum total of happiness counts, then 
its distribution is important only so far as it affects that total. But 
. in that case the individual has only instrumental significance, 
namely, as a particular body to which happiness can attach. 
That, however, is a reductio ad absurdum, since it deprives per-
sons of any moral significance. 
An appraisal of Fried's view of persons can conveniently 
begin with this critical argument. The utilitarian may well feel 
that the argument caricatures utilitarianism before it butchers it. 
Moral assessment of persons-and hence their moral signifi-
cance-is not exhausted, in utilitarian terms, by determining the 
rightness or wrongness of their actions. Mill, for example, be-
lieved that 
[ u]tilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable pos-
sessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to 
allow to all of them their full worth. They are also aware that a 
right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and 
that actions which are blamable often proceed from qualities enti-
tled to praise.77 
In addition, there may be perfectly good reasons of utility for 
directing our concern to those most immediately affected by our 
72. See p. 201. 
73. See p. 13. 
74. See pp. 32-39, especially pp. 32-35. 
75. Pp. 32, 33, 36-37. 
76. See pp. 36-37. 
77. J.S. MILL, supra note 1, at 26. 
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acts. Effects on those near to us are often easily known; conse-
quences remote in space or time are difficult to predict and to 
identify; and the time for calculation is usually short. Thus it will 
rarely be productive for private individuals to trace the conse-
quences of their actions as one might follow the concentric circles 
generated by a stone cast into water.78 Finally, a case can be made 
that within Mill's utilitarianism an act can fail to promote the 
general welfare in the most efficient way, yet fall short of being 
morally wrong.79 Such an act can, of course, be criticized because 
it does not optimally advance utility. But for the act to be wrong, 
and not merely undesirable or inexpedient, there must be warrimt 
for "internal sanctions" like guilt feelings or pangs of conscience. 
To feel guilty or be conscience-stricken detracts, so far as it goes, 
from happiness. Hence, warrant for calling an act wrong presup-
poses a justification for embracing the costs of internalizing cer-
tain values so that internal sanctions will be felt. True enough, if 
the utilitarian recognizes desirable qualities other than acting 
rightly, or generally directs concern to the people in his vicinity, 
or takes into account the costs of guilt in deciding whether an act 
is wrong, that is because utility is ultimately served by doing so. 
And perhaps utilitarianism is ultimately vulnerable to some 
objection that it cannot adequately respect the separateness of 
persons. Nevertheless, I doubt that it falls prey to the version of 
this objection which is embodied in Fried's critical argument of 
disintegrating universality. 80 
Whatever the merits of a utilitarian view of persons, one 
might still have reservations about Fried's alternative perspec-
tive. If I understand Fried correctly, a good person scrupulously 
observes categorical moral norms, yet parts with none of this 
goodness through absence of disinterested benevolence; and in 
moral deliberation, a good person attends only to what the norms, 
and their accompanying casuistry, require and forbid. This is an 
odd image of a good person. It would· often be supposed that 
lacking a substantial amount of sympathy and concern for the 
welfare of others diminishes a person's goodness. A good person, 
in addition to observing the requirements of justice by not violat-
78. See id. at 25-26. 
79. See Lyons, Human Rights and the General Welfare, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 119-
23 (1977). 
80. The utilitarian is likely to protest similarly against Fried's abrupt dismissal of 
an analysis of roles along the lines adumbrated by Mill and Sidgwick (p. 170). Such a 
utilitarian strategy is not mentioned in Fried's earlier presentation of the argument from 
disintegrating universality. 
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ing others' rights, displays such virtues as charity and forgive-
ness. No doubt it would be supererogatory to possess these virtues 
to a high degree, but any person properly called good must have 
them to some extent. It may be less clear how a good person 
reflects sensitively on moral problems. He might well find un-
satisfactory both baroque calculations of utility and simple good-
heartedness. Perhaps it is more likely that a good person tries to 
combine reflective moral capacity with a measure of virtue and 
generalized concern for others. That combination seems much 
attenuated in Fried's view of persons. 
Lest all this be thought merely of abstract interest, it is worth 
noting that Fried's overemphasis of persons' responsibility for 
their choices leads to some debatable practical conclusions. 81 An 
illustration is Fried's defense, in his chapter on negative rights, 
of a consumption tax as the proper way for society to obtain a fair 
contribution from its members. 82 Such a tax would be based on 
the monetary value of goods or services consumed, and is said to 
be preferable to a tax on wealth, income, capacity to earn, or 
some other basis. Fried's discussion suggests two arguments in 
favor of a tax on consumption. Consumption accurately measures 
what one draws from the common pool of resources. 83 And a con-
sumption tax "respects individual rights, because its incidence 
falls only on what a person chooses to do, not on what he might 
do-as would a tax on capacities, talents, or dispositions."84 
Both reasons are questionable. First, consumption as ordi-
narily understood is not the only thing which is a draft on com-
mon resources. Resources also include opportunities for the pro-
duction of goods and services. To avail oneself of certain oppor-
tunities and the benefits flowing from them may affect the com-
petitive position of others. If one becomes a factory owner and 
uses raw materials, or if one becomes a physician, then there 
commonly will be less opportunity for others to become entrepre-
neurs or physicians. Of course, it does not follow that there will 
be a net loss to others; gainers may be able to compensate losers, 
as by a scheme of taxation. But any such scheme would seem to 
be based partly on income or use of opportunities, not on con-
81. In this connection consider also Fried's use of the argument that the would,be 
robber may in effect be choosing physical injury if the owner defends his property. See 
pp. 46-47; text at notes 47, 49-50 supra. 
82. See pp. 139-50, especially pp. 147-48. 
83. See p. 147. 
84. P. 148. 
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sumption as usually understood. 85 Second, consumption is not 
always the product of free choice. Much that we consume has its 
roots in personal needs, advertising, class or social conditioning, 
or a host of other factors which cannot plausibly be cast as choices 
to consume this or that. 86 In one remark Fried seems to allow that, 
while the tax would be based on consumption, the tax rate might 
be progressive. 87 Perhaps this signals a healthy retreat from the 
idea that there is, or can be, any single measure of fair contribu-
tion. Nevertheless, there is a problem of consistency. If the tax is 
progressive, then some factor apart from consumption must be 
the index for the tax rate, and it is unclear what factor could 
comport with the choice model. In all this, of course, I do not 
suggest that a consumption tax cannot be a useful part of a com-
prehensive tax policy, but merely question Fried's reasons for 
making such a tax the sole measure of fair contribution to society. 
V. ROLES AND LAWYERS 
It is against the background of Fried's general moral theory 
that his discussion of roles, including the role of lawyer, must be 
seen. For Fried, roles are "forms of life"88 adopted in the 
"discretionary space left by the categories of right and wrong. "89 
The occupant of a role may lavish more time, energy, and re-
sources on, for instance, a patient, client, or friend than fairness 
or efficiency can justify. 90 This may seem anomalous, but we are 
urged to accept, not suppress, the anomaly; it would be inappro-
priate to compel impartial behavior when a role is involved.91 
Fried goes on to say that the 
traditional conception of professional loyalty is sound and practi-
cal. It offers a form of life and work which a just society must 
permit and a morally sensitive person may confidently adopt. It is 
85. Fried seems concerned to allow taxation for consumption of public goods (p. 147 
n.*), but his later emphasis on consumption being connected with depriving others of 
goods (p. 149) may block such taxation; for use by a person of many public goods, such 
as a defense system, does not deprive others of those goods. 
86. On pp. 124-26, 146-47, Fried stresses the role of free choice in constructing our 
own system of wants and tastes. But unless his remarks are to beg the question, I think 
that at most they show only that we freely choose some of our wants and tastes. It is 
perfectly consistent to reject philosophical determinism and still to insist that in fact 
many of our wants and tastes which bear on consumption are not in an ordinary sense 
freely chosen. 
87. Seep. 147. See also p. 147 n.•. 
88. P. 167. See also p. 3 ("patterns"). 
89. P. 168. 
90. See pp. 168-71. 
91. Seep. 175. 
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my thesis that if a lawyer in a reasonably just society gives good 
and faithful counsel, then he fulfills his role well and that role itself 
is a good one. 92 
Fried concludes that the lawyer is "not morally entitled . . . to 
engage his own person in doing personal harm to another, though 
he may work the system for his client even if the system then 
works injustice. "93 
To appraise Fried's discussion it will be useful to distinguish 
two questions: 
(1) Should a reasonably just society allow individuals to occupy 
the role of lawyer as Fried understands it? 
(2) Can a morally sensitive person be such a lawyer? 
A negative answer to the first question seems correct for many 
cases involving property, contracts, and taxation.94 Fried holds 
that a lawyer may choose clients in any way he wishes and may 
assist a client in a spiteful lawsuit. 95 If a lawyer selects wealthy 
clients, and if those less well off generally get less competent or 
less thorough lawyers, then the wealthy will receive better legal 
advice on the whole. Better advice, particularly in matters of 
property, contracts, and taxation, will enable the wealthy to en-
trench their position. Hence over time class differences will be 
exacerbated. Again, in those cases where a lawyer uses the legal 
system to win a meritless suit for a spiteful client, he produces 
injustice. In both instances, observe that the society is only rea-
sonably just; its grip on fairness and its members' sense of justice, 
unlike those of a perfectly just society, are less than complete. For 
this reason, were lawyers as Fried conceives them permitted, their 
manipulation of the system might eventually strip the society of 
its reasonably just character. It might well be wrong for a perni-
cious society to ensure its own preservation. A reasonably just 
society, however, would seem entitled to take some measures to 
protect its just character. Hence, for a large and important class 
of cases, it would have good reason to disallow the role of lawyer 
as Fried understands it. 
A defender of Fried might reply that the adverse conse-
quences have been exaggerated or would be outweighed by good 
consequences, or that, consequences aside, persons should be al-
lowed to develop their individuality by acting as lawyers. But the 
choice is not simply between having lawyers as Fried sees them 
92. P. 178 (emphasis in original). 
93. P. 193 (footnote omitted). 
94. For criminal cases a 9ifferent response may be in order. 
95. See pp. 181, 179. 
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and having no lawyers at all. If consequences are relevant, it must 
be shown that having lawyers on Fried's model is better on bal-
ance than having lawyers who answer to any other conception of 
their role. This will be very hard to show; for alternative concep-
tions which hinder manipulating the system to produce injustice 
appear, other things being equal, better calculated to preserve a 
reasonably just society. Similarly, if appeal is made to respect for 
persons, the individuality of a lawyer on Fried's model must be 
shown to be superior to the individuality of all ·other sorts of 
lawyers whose capacity to produce injustice is more circum-
scribed. This again seems difficult to show. Thus a reasonably 
just society, should it permit lawyers at all, may have good 
grounds for adopting both a conception of their role and an insti-
tutional framework which limit their freedom to produce injus-
tice. 
Let us turn to the second question: Can a morally sensitive 
person be a lawyer as Fried understands that role?96 This question 
should not arise if society prohibits such lawyers. But suppose 
that my answer to the first question is mistaken and that a rea-
sonably just society can tolerate lawyers as Fried conceives them. 
Does it follow that a morally sensitive person could be one? To 
answer this question we must clarify what it means to occupy that 
role. One possibility would be that, while others see a person as 
a lawyer conforming to Fried's model, the person does not see 
himself in that image and indeed combats that model. It is as 
hard to say that this possibility involves moral wrong as it is easy 
to see that this case is so innocuous as to be uninteresting. A 
different possibility would be that others identify a person as a 
lawyer answering Fried's description, and the person sees pimself 
in this way but never actually manipulates the system to produce 
injustice. This is a close:r, but still not very controversial, case. 
Perhaps it is not morally wrong to be such a person; but, on the 
other side, perhaps a morally sensitive person would not hold 
himself out as someone who would use the system to produce 
injustice. The difficult and important case is presented by a third 
possibility: A person sees himself in Fried's image of the lawyer, 
is so seen by others, and on some occasions actually employs the 
system to produce injustice. Here it seems morally not only insen-
96. This question, unlike the first, does not involve social enforcement. The issue is 
whether it is wrong to occupy a certain role; it is not the issue of moral paternalism of 
whether, if it harms a person to occupy a role, society should bar its occupation. Fried's 
position on this matter is not clear. See pp. 172, 175, 182. See also p. 180. 
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sitive but wrong to occupy the role of lawyer as Fried conceives 
it. This conclusion does not conflict with an affirmative answer 
to the first question. Someone might consider it desirable in a 
reasonably just society that a certain role be filled, yet shrink 
from the idea that any morally sensitive person could fill it. Sup-
pose that you believe in capital punishment. Then you may con-
clude that society must have executioners, but argue that no 
person who is sensitive to the harms which typically count as 
moral wrongs could exhibit the lack of squeamishness which 
being an executioner betokens. The point is not that lawyers on 
Fried's model are executioners. It is that a morally good person 
might find it hard to occupy and take advantage of the role of 
lawyer so conceived. 
If Fried's discussion of lawyers indeed has these deficiencies, 
what at bottom has gone wrong? Some will argue that Fried exag-
gerates the ways in which lawyers resemble friends, and fails to 
consider changes in or alternatives to the adversary system that 
would reduce lawyers' capacity to produce injustice. These argu-
ments have merit. Yet no diagnosis would be complete which 
neglected to draw attention to a pair of fundamental philosophi-
cal points raised by Fried's discussion. 
The first point has to do with two connected questions about 
roles. These are knotty questions, treated here very incompletely, 
but it is vital to get clear on them. (i) What is a role?97 Roles as 
normally understood seem to involve social or institutional be-
havior related to a person's status, not just, as Fried says, 
"patterns" or "forms of life"98 which are left open by the catego-
ries of right and wrong. Moreover, roles differ widely-a matter 
not sufficiently attended to by Fried. There are public roles (cabi-
net minister or military chief of staff), occupational roles (physi-
cian or lawyer, but probably not plumber or mason), family roles 
{parent, but not nephew or second cousin), and others. It is per-
haps not obvious that to be a friend is to occupy a role, at least if 
the "role" of friend means something other than the place or 
duties of a friend. Nor is it clear that the contours of a role are 
always set in the same way; the mix of express definition, social 
convention, and intention of the occupant seems to vary. (ii) On 
what basis do roles insulate their occupants in some measure 
from common obligations? Perhaps, as Fried suggests, insulation 
97. My attention was first drawn to the importance of this question by Charles W. 
Wolfram. 
98. Pp. 3, 167. 
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has something to do with respect for individual personality.99 But 
while this suggestion may be correct so far as it goes, it does not 
take us very far. I suspect that the basis of insulation is likely to 
shift importantly from one type of role to the next, and that this 
shift undermines analogies between the role of lawyer and other 
roles. With public roles, an important factor is that large issues 
and numbers of people are commonly involved. For this reason a 
cabinet minister or military chief of staff may sometimes be enti-
tled not to try to assess the full effect of his decisions on particular 
individuals. The lawyer's case seems dissimilar. Here the issues 
are typically narrower and the impact on those affected more 
readily discernible, though one may have to deal specially with 
lawyers who handle public law issues. Now compare the case of 
friendship. A salient reason that we do not moralize in some ways 
about how friends have to take account of the interests of third 
parties is that it is terribly costly to do so. It is intrusive, and the 
risks of drawing conclusions on the basis of erroneous or incom-
plete information are high. Much less clearly does this reasoning 
apply to lawyers. For a society could have a strong requirement 
of client equity, and compel every lawyer to do some work for the 
poor. In addition, a society might think of legal assistance as a 
scarce resource, though it would be unusual so to conceive of 
friendship. Friendship and happiness are valuable, but having 
them does not seriously affect the amount left for others. Here one 
might wonder why Fried's positive right to a fair share of social 
resources does not include a right to legal assistance, and hence 
significantly limit a lawyer's right to select clients as he 
wishes-especially since a substantial investment of social re-
sources is needed to train lawyers. 
The second point relates to an underlying philosophical as-
sumption in Fried's discussion. The assumption concerns not 
what lawyers may do in the course of their work, but how they 
may choose their clients. In Fried's view, clients may be chosen 
in any way the lawyer wishes.100 A corollary of this view is that 
potential clients may not complain about selection. The corol-
lary, as Fried observes, rests on the thesis that no one can claim 
to be wronged or treated unfairly if someone, who has the means 
to help, helps fewer persons than he could, or helps persons less 
in need of assistance. 101 This thesis may seem counterintuitive to 
99. See pp. 176, 179, 180. 
100. See p. 181. 
101. The thesis of this section and indeed of this chapter might well be 
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readers innocent of academic moral philosophy, and even among 
professional philosophers it is far more controversial than Fried's 
treatment acknowledges.102 Respect for persons demands that we 
attend not only to those who make choices but also to others 
affected by choices. Thus we must, ceteris paribus, respect the 
chooser's integrity by acknowledging and accepting any morally 
permissible choice. But in the case at hand cetera are not paria. 
At issue is how we are to appraise the lawyer's behavior when he 
has a choice between helping one group of persons or helping a 
larger or needier group. My thought would be that, without more, 
the lawyer is morally bound to help the larger or needier group. 
Equal concern and respect for other human beings require that 
much. As Derek Parfit has perceptively argued, we help the larger 
number or those in greater need because we give equal weight to 
helping each: "Each counts for one. That is why more count for 
more. "103 Moreover, if some need legal assistance because of past 
injustice, or need it more acutely because of an especially disad-
vantaged position, their need may count for more than it would 
otherwise. Of course, the role of lawyer may alter somewhat the 
moral position of its occupant-as by creating new duties, rights, 
and liberties. But this falls well short of Frie d's view that a lawyer 
can morally choose clients however he wishes. 
This second point alludes compendiously to features of 
Fried's moral vision that this Review has questioned. Fried 
seems to endorse what might be styled a boundary-line concep-
tion of morality. His categorical norms apply within the limits 
set by intention; his negative rights sharply curtail encroach-
ments on the individual's moral discretion; his view of persons 
and roles presents persons as individual units who may give sub-
stantial preference to friends and clients. This Review has tried 
to suggest a broader and more complicated picture of a good 
person's moral life. Such a person will find that moral norms 
often intersect, with no clear indication of what course of action 
is right, and will attend more fully to consequences, even when 
they are unintended. He will look not only to norms of right and 
summed up by G. E. M. Anscombe's argument that if saving the life of one patient 
requires a massive dose of a drug that could be divided up and used to save five 
other people, not one of those five can claim that he has been wronged .••• [P. 
219] 
See Ans com be, Who is Wronged?, supra note 8. As Fried notes on p. 219, Ans com he's brief 
argument is greatly developed by Taurek, supra note 8. 
· 102. See Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 285 (1978). 
103. Id. at 301. 
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wrong, construed as requirements for just dealings with others, 
but also to the development of such virtues as charity and for-
giveness. And he will have a wider sympathy for others. Gener-
alized benevolence may nqt be an unconstrained duty, but will 
reflect an equal concern and respect for other human beings 
and support a broader conception of social responsibility. I can-
not claim to have proved that this picture is superior to Fried's 
moral vision. The picture is often sketchy and faint; proof may, 
at all events, be out of the question. Even so, perhaps there is 
warrant for developing this different view of what it means to 
be a good person. · 
